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IN SEARCH OF FAMILY VALUE:
CONSTRUCTING A FRAMEWORK FOR
JURISPRUDENTIAL DISCOURSE
STEVEN H. HOBBS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In examining the contemporary notion that the modem family is "in
crisis," Professor Stanley Hauerwas, a theologian, suggests that the diffi-
culty in understanding present family issues arises from a lack of consensus
about the moral value of the family.' Hauerwas suggests that there are
those who believe in families and see them as morally good-both for soci-
ety and for those who choose to form families.2 However, moral value is
difficult to define and our contemporary language on morality is ill-suited to
facilitate the inquiry.' Without a common moral frame of reference, the
debate rings hollow and shallow.
Professor Carl E. Schneider explores the concept of the moral value of
the family from a legal perspective by considering "the relationship between
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. B.A. 1975, Harvard College; J.D. 1979,
University of Pennsylvania. This article was made possible in part through research assistance
from the Frances Lewis Law Center. The author wishes to thank his colleagues Larry George,
Fay Wilson Hobbs, Judy McMorrow, Brian Murchison, Thomas Shaffer, and Shaun Shaughnessy
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The author also extends his gratitude to research
assistants Kerry Cuneo, Mary Mulligan, and James Cowan.
1. STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE
CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC 155 (1981).
2. An exploration of the concept of the moral value of the family aids the inquiry into the
crisis facing the family today. High divorce rates, teenage pregnancies, child custody and support
battles, domestic violence, and other ills suggest that belonging to a family is not always that
wonderful. The bride and groom do not always live happily ever after. In spite of the reports on
the family's demise, this article argues that the family has significant moral value.
3. Hauerwas observes:
Ethicists provide little help in recovering the experience of the family. For modem ethical
reflection the family is simply an anomaly, a curiosity left over from previous ages. From
the "moral point of view" identification with relatives appears at best a sentimental attach-
ment-more likely an irrational commitment. Nowhere in contemporary ethical literature
is there discussion of the simple but fundamental assumption that we have a responsibility
to our own children that overrides responsibility to children who are not ours. Although a
powerful assumption, there is no adequate account in contemporary ethical reflection of
why we hold it or if it is justified. Instead, the best my colleagues can offer is the doubtful
thesis that children ought to have rights.
HAUERWAS, supra note 1, at 156.
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morals and family law."' He reflects on the reasons and implications for
the current, revolutionary changes in the area of family law.' Schneider
theorizes that "the tendency toward diminished moral discourse and trans-
ferred moral responsibility in family law" has transformed modem family
law.6 In exploring this thesis, he challenges us not to view this inquiry as a
search for "'moral images' of the family in the law"7 but rather as a
"search ... for the law's moral discourse, between institutions, over time,
about families."'
Schneider's statement concerning "discourse between institutions, over
time, about families" is vividly captured in our domestic relations jurispru-
dence. Each case is the real-life drama of a family working out what is
valuable and important to it, while at the same time remaining within the
bounds of the law. When our lives interact with the law, a discourse arises
about who we are, what our hopes and dreams are for our family, how we
form companionate relationships, and how we view raising children.
Responding to the challenge to search for moral value, this article is an
exploration of the historical and contemporary moral discourse in the law.
Our Constitution suggests that having and forming a family is an inherent,
inalienable right, the exercise of which demands the fulfillment of certain
moral obligations.9 The interrelationship of family rights and family obliga-
4. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1806 (1985).
5. Id. at 1807-08. In contemplating these changes, Professor Schneider makes the following
central premise:
Four forces in American institutions and culture have shaped modem family law. They
are the legal tradition of noninterference in family affairs, the ideology of liberal individual-
ism, American society's changing moral beliefs, and the rise of "psychologic man." These
forces have occasioned a crucial change: a diminution of the law's discourse in moral
terms about the relations between family members, and the transfer of many moral deci-
sions from the law to the people the law once regulated. Id.
6. Id. at 1809.
7. Id. at 1823.
8. Id. at 1826 (emphasis in the original). Schneider describes what he means by discourse:
By legal discourse I refer to the ways the law expresses ideas, both among legal institutions
and between legal institutions and the people and social institutions the law wishes to
affect. The discourse that I will explore is primarily of two kinds: first, the use by courts
or legislatures of moral language and ideas, and second, the prohibition of conduct on
moral grounds. The latter category raises questions about whether the law's failure to
prohibit conduct also is part of moral discourse.
Id. at 1827 (emphasis in the original). Schneider also defines what he means by a moral decision:
"A decision made on moral grounds turns on whether particular conduct is 'right' or 'wrong,'
whether it accords with the obligations owed other people or oneself." Id.
9. The family, as the basic social unit for individuals, is charged by society to provide those
individuals with emotional support and economic necessities, and to socialize the family members,
enabling the individual members to participate in the larger society. These obligations, as de-
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tion, as reflected in family law, is a source of enlightenment on the moral
value embodied in the family.
This article proceeds from the assumption that the moral value of the
family has been, and continues to be, articulated in unique ways through
family law, which is society's system of regulating family relationships.
Family law recognizes and accommodates the constitutional right to form
and maintain a family. This article will further examine how and why soci-
ety, through law, requires individuals to fulfill certain moral obligations
that are a concomitant part of the right to form and maintain a family.
Finally, the concept of family right and obligation will be explored by
analyzing the differing textures of each, starting with a consideration of the
family as a basic civil right guaranteed by our republican form of govern-
ment and continuing with a study of how the nature of that right is shaped
by legal obligations. This analysis will be made in light of the interrelation-
ship between family and society, and society and law. The goal of this arti-
cle is to achieve a better understanding of the concept of the moral value of
a family and how this value influences the legal rights and obligations that
arise at family formation.
II. METHODOLOGICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE
Family values, individuals who seek to establish families, and the values
of the family legal system (the law of domestic relationships) all interact. A
relationship exists between families and family members on one side and
family law on the other. The family helps to shape the law as the law
shapes the family. Stated in terms of moral value, the moral values of the
family shape the law and the moral values of the law shape the family.
Within this broad approach, I will borrow from the theological method-
ology as developed by James Gustafson in his two-volume work, Ethics
from a Theocentric Perspective.10 His goal is similar to the one pursued in
this article-to search for moral value in the various aspects of our lives,
including marriage and the family. Gustafson's scope and purpose is far
more encompassing, as the following passage indicates:
I shall develop an account of moral life and ethical thought around a
central concept of human life. Man (individual persons, communi-
scribed by family constitutional law, are directly related to the costs each family member must
bear for the right to have a family, the basic integrity of which is protected by the society itself
through the law. These legal obligations are attendant upon and relate to the legal rights to form
a family. See Steven H. Hobbs, We Are Family: Changing Times, Changing Ideologies and
Changing Law, 14 CAP. U. L. REv. 511 (1985); see generally, WILLIAM J. GOODE, THE FAMILY
(1964) (discussing essential functions of the family).
10. 2 JAMES M. GUSTAFSON, ETHics FROM A THEOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE (1981).
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ties, and species) is a participant in the patterns and processes of inter-
dependence of life in the world. . . . Man has capacities to affect
subsequent courses of events and states of affairs, whether in the
lives of friends and family members, the conduct of political affairs,
or the ways in which nature itself will be developed.'
For Gustafson, we are agents and actors in this world with a relation-
ship to God and God's purposes.' 2 His account of moral life and ethical
thought, therefore, is theocentric. As a result of that perspective he poses
the following moral question:
What is God enabling and requiring us, as participants in the pat-
terns and processes of interdependence of life in the world, to be and
to do? The general answer can also be [stated]. We, as participants,
are to relate ourselves and all things in a manner appropriate to our
and their relations to God.13
This is the heart of his approach to theocentric ethics. Gustafson's
framework illustrates the central issue of this article when it asks and exam-
ines the question: "What is God enabling and requiring us to be and to do
as participants in the patterns and processes of interdependence in marriage
and family life?" 14 Gustafson answers the question as follows: "We are to
relate ourselves and all things in a manner appropriate to our and their
relations to God."15 Consequently, our marriage and family relationships
are structured according to our relationship with God.
Although expressed in theological language, Gustafson suggests that the
inquiry can be made in secular terms by considering values not necessarily
based in religion.16 Restating Gustafson's formula in very broad terms, this
article poses the following question: What is the law and society enabling
and requiring us, citizens or members of society, to be and do as partici-
pants in the patterns and processes of interdependence in marriage and fam-
ily life? A secular answer expressed in Gustafson's terms would be that we
must relate not only ourselves, as families and family members, but also all
things pertaining to family in a manner appropriate to our relationship
with society and its laws. This answer acknowledges the fact that through
11. Id. at 145 (emphasis in the original). However, Gustafson does warn us that our power to
effect change is limited by "aspects of the world beyond our intentions and control." Id. Also,
our participation is limited by our temporal nature. He describes us as "stewards; we are tempo-
rary, responsible custodians of, and contributors to, the realms in which we participate." Id.
12. Id. at 146.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 153.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 146-47 & nn. 4 & 6.
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our societal and legal relationships, we are shaping and influencing the very
nature of society and law.
A. Value Defined
With politicians often espousing "traditional family values" as one of
their qualities of fine character, the diverse electorate must apply its own
sense of meaning to this talisman in order to understand the worth of such
values. Let us now consider, therefore, what is meant by value when used
in conjunction with family (as defined in the section below).
In describing value, we begin with the classic definition from the Latin
valere, "be worth, be strong,"17 defined in part as: "1. worth: the quality
of a thing that makes it desirable, desired, useful, or an object of interest. 2.
of excellence: that which is esteemed, prized, or regarded highly, or as a
good.")18
A legal text provides another definition for value as: "[T]he utility of an
object in satisfying, directly or indirectly, the needs of human beings.""
These textbook definitions suggest that our inquiry must focus on fun-
damental human needs which are desirable, regarded highly, or of impor-
tance. Again Gustafson is instructive when he discusses moral value in the
context of human needs. He suggests that when we focus on human needs,
we are engaging in an ordering of our human relationships and our commu-
nities in a way that promotes the survival and flourishing of human life.2"
In terms of the family, Gustafson suggests a way in which value can be
defined and discerned:
Moral reflection about marriage and family seeks to provide direc-
tion to natural drives and social needs; it is rational activity based
upon what is given both in "nature" and in particular social circum-
stances in given times and places. Values and principles are backed
by these needs, and when they are objectified in rational ways they
can provide direction to the ordering of relationships so that these
needs are more properly met.2"
Gustafson couches his discussion in terms of the natural drives and so-
cial needs of individuals who seek to form families.22 These drives and
17. PETER A. ANGELES, THE HARPER COLLINS DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 329 (2d ed.
1992).
18. Id.
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (6th ed. 1990).
20. 2 GUSTAFSON, supra note 10, at 158-59.
21. Id. at 159.
22. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 70 (1992) (examining sexuality in terms of
the legal treatment it has received).
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needs can be discerned by a study of the "particularities and intimacies of
marriage and family relationships, ' ' 23 which are discussed in fuller form be-
low. One should note, as Gustafson does, that failure to meet human needs,
either as individual actors or as a society, may cause some of the societal
problems that we face today.24
To place this definitional endeavor into a relational context, we must
ask several questions. First, what is the nature of the interaction among
individuals in families, among families and the state (society), and between
individual family members and the state (society)? Second, what makes a
family desirable, useful, and highly regarded? Third, how do we measure a
family's utility in satisfying the needs of human beings? Fourth, why is
society interested in the family? Fifth, by whom and by what "judgment of
importance"25 is the family form considered to be a preferred form of social
relationship? These are the questions that our domestic relations jurispru-
dence ultimately attempts to answer and this article explores those jurispru-
dential attempts.
B. Family Defined
As a society, we find it difficult to decide what exactly constitutes a
family. In some circles we tout the nuclear family as the model family; yet
divorce has broken up many "model" families, causing a disproportionate
increase in single parent, female-headed households. 26 Therefore, it would
be unrealistic and elitist for us to choose one particular family style or cate-
gory as having the greatest moral value. Each family style reflects some
aspects of the moral values deemed important by society. Because such a
broad range of family styles and relationships exists, we need to expand our
scope in order to capture a more universal definition of family.
What is the essence of the family? What makes the family what it is,
regardless of style, shape, or size? A working, formal, law-based definition
23. 2 GUSTAFSON, supra note 10, at 159.
24. Gustafson aptly notes this cause-and-effect relationship when he writes:
Failure to establish and to maintain certain relationships and failure to meet fundamental
needs leads to disorder and to consequences which are detrimental both to the institution
of marriage and family and to the well-being of individual members. Since relations within
the institution are not those of biological cause and effect, or of action and reaction, the
importance of human agency, of capacities for self-determination and for directing interac-
tions, obviously has to be taken into account.
Id.
25. See WILLIAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 604 (1980).
26. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE U.S.: 1991, at 43-50 (1 l1th ed. 1991) (giving the increase in single parent, female-headed
households between 1970-1980 as 58.3%, and between 1980-1990 as 25.1%).
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of the family could be: "[A] fundamental [legal] relationship established by
birth, adoption or choice in which persons are responsible to each other for
basic intellectual, emotional, physical, social and spiritual nurture."27 This
relationship creates a unique species of legal rights and obligations.28 A
legal, domestic relationship is generally classified as a status. Husband-
wife, parent-child, and guardian-ward are the universal status relationships
that are domestic or familial in nature.29 These status relationships are cre-
ated, ordered, and protected by the state. The concept can be expanded to
include alternative forms of family relationships, such as cohabitating heter-
osexual or homosexual couples and surrogate parenting arrangements,
which have been given consideration in law."0
This formal definition of family recognizes the legal concept of status
but does not adequately contextualize the legal fullness of the relationship.
A more comprehensive and functional definition of family would attempt to
encompass what functions the law requires families and family members to
perform." In a prior work, I addressed this concept of function as a defini-
tion task by utilizing the following formulation:
27. William E. Diehl, Conclusions and Conference Actions, ACADEMY: LUTHERANS IN
PROFRESSION: SOCIETAL CHANGE AND THE FAM., Vol. XLI 1985, at 79.
28. Even in a single-parent household, the legal and moral obligations do not change. Unless
the absent parent's rights have been terminated, he or she continues to have state-imposed familial
rights and obligations. But this definition does not encompass the notion of extended familial
relationships created by kinship nor does it include the formal or informal clan concepts of family.
29. See 1 JAMES SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS 1 (6th ed. 1921) ("The law of the domestic relations is the law of the household or family,
as distinguished from that of individuals in the external concerns of life. Four leading topics are
embraced under this head: First, husband and wife. Second, parent and child. Third, guardian
and ward. Fourth, infancy.").
30. See Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a
Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1830-35 (1987); Martha Minow, Redefining Families:
Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 269, 270-76 (1991); Rebecca L. Melton, Note,
Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of
"Family'", 29 J. FAM. L. 497, 501-03 (1991).
31. See Hobbs, supra note 9, at 520-21. In a previous article, I provided a fuller explanation
of this premise:
The history of the family is in part the history of the law offering protection to the family
unit from outside interference with the relationship. The law also offers protection to the
individual within the familial relationship from loss of valued rights by acts of other family
members. The legal protection offered is based on society's articulation of the collective
conscience operating through governmental mechanisms. The law thus becomes a reflec-
tion of the interrelationship between the demands of the society and the demands of indi-
vidual family units. It gauges normative behavior and codifies the norms establishing a
system of rights and responsibilities. The familial rights and responsibilities of individual
family members are owed in part to society and in part to other individual [sic] within the
family units.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
1992]
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The law provides that at the instant of birth, the operation of a
valid marriage ceremony, or the judicial recognition of a quasi-legal
or legal relationship, a legal family relationship is constituted. Col-
lective society has, at a minimum, demanded that the legal family
unit must socialize its members, provide the necessaries of life and
provide emotional security. The law imposes upon the family pri-
mary responsibility for fulfilling these functions. This is reflected in
laws which require the support and emotional nurture of children,
the support of dependent spouses, the provision of education, and
familial responsibility for the control and discipline of juveniles.
The nature of that legal family relationship is such that if you do
not fulfill these functions as agreed upon by society, society, operat-
ing through the judicial mechanisms of the state, will intervene in
the relationship. The state may reorder the relationship by tempo-
rarily or permanently removing a member of the unit. The state
may also demand that family members demonstrate behavior which
falls within norms set by the collective society. Failure to demon-
strate such behavior will result in loss of the full benefits of the legal
relationship or complete termination of the family relationship.32
This article provides an opportunity to expand upon and further de-
velop this family-as-function definition. It will consider how and why indi-
viduals enter into companionate relationships of legal cognizance. It will
consider why individuals form relationships and why society has a legal
interest in what is by nature and custom a private matter. The discussion
will not, by necessity, be a complete account and other articles have consid-
ered this issue in far more detail.33 For that same reason, this article will
not present an account of the parent and child relationship.34
What this article attempts to convey is a sense of the private and public
dichotomy of family relationships by considering the process of family crea-
tion and dissolution from the viewpoint of both the individuals involved
and the state, which is deeply concerned about those individuals. The crea-
tion process is partly private and partly public: private because the individ-
uals involved have free choice; public because the state certifies the marital
institution and the parental relationship. Likewise, the dissolution process
also has a private and a public component. The following sections will con-
sider these twin themes of family law.
32. Id. at 523.
33. See generally, AUGUSTUS Y. NAPIER, THE FRAGILE BOND: IN SEARCH OF AN EQUAL,
INTIMATE AND ENDURING MARRIAGE (1988).
34. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879
(1984).
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1. The Love Connection-A Private Choice
Essentially, the traditional marital relationship is spawned by love be-
tween a consenting man and woman." Although simply stated, love is a
baffling topic that at times is unfathomable. In Habits of the Heart, Robert
Bellah and his co-authors attempt to illuminate the coming together of two
individuals in love.36 Bellah posits that "[a] love relationship is good be-
cause it works, because it 'feels right,' because it is where one feels most at
home."37 It is as if love is a fundamental emotion that, once ignited, draws
individuals into intimate association spontaneously. 3 Although bards
might be better able to describe love, we romantically know it when we see
it. 3
9
Within the love relationship an individual can express and feel intimacy.
"Many speak of sharing-thoughts, feelings, tasks, values, or life goals-as
the greatest virtue in a relationship."'  However, locked within a love rela-
tionship is the concept of the individual self.4 ' It is the individual who
chooses through love to give and receive self. In fact, the very process of
loving completes or moves us toward a more complete definition of who
and what we are individually.42 Bellah's description of the relationship of a
couple supports this proposition: "[T]heir relationship embodies a deep
sense of their own identity, and thus a sense that the self has found its right
35. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COM-
MITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 90 (1985).
36. See generally id. at 85-112 (describing the tension caused by conflicting conceptions of
love and marriage in our society).
37. Id. at 91.
38. Id. Belah notes that such a relationship "seems so natural, so spontaneous that it carries
a powerful sense of inevitability." Id
39. See Paul Gregory, Eroticism and Love, AM. PHIL. Q., Oct. 1988, at 339; Cindy Hazan &
Phillip Shaver, Romantic Love Conceptualized as an Attachment Process, J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL., 1987, at 511; Carin Rubinstein, The Modern Art of Courtly Love, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
July 1983, at 40.
40. BELLAH, supra note 35, at 91. Bellah describes one of the subjects interviewed for his
study:
Nan Pfautz, a divorced secretary in her mid-forties, describes how, after being alone for
many years, she fell deeply in love. "I think it was the sharing, the real sharing of feelings.
I don't think I've ever done that with another man." Nan knew that she loved Bill because
"I let all my barriers down. I really was able to be myself with him-very, very comforta-
ble. I could be as gross as I wanted or I could be as funny as I wanted, as silly as I wanted.
I didn't worry about, or have to worry-or didn't anyway-about what his reaction was
going to be. I was just me. I was free to be me." The natural sharing of one's real self is,
then, the essence of love.
41. Id at 55-57 (Bellah examines the individual and actualization of self).
42. Id at 90-93.
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place in the world. Love embodies one's real self."43 In opening oneself up
to the intimacies of a love relationship, one comes face to face with one's
true self.
But therein lies love's greatest paradox. Ultimately, "[t]he very sharing
that promises to be the fulfillment of love can also threaten the self. The
danger is that one will, in sharing too completely with another, 'lose one-
self.' "' Sharing, therefore, can create the very seeds that will destroy the
love relationship and lead to dissolution. Giving so much to one person
threatens the loss of self by becoming that person's alter ego.45 As an-
other's alter ego, an individual either will smother the other person in love
or become an unattractive shell of the person whom the other initially
loved.46
To have a flourishing love relation, one must mitigate the damage to the
self that may arise in the giving of the self through love.4 7 When two people
enter into a marital relationship, each partner's unique individuality should
not be lost. A sense of individuality should be maintained for a healthy
43. Id. at 91.
44. Id. at 92.
Love, then, creates a dilemma for Americans. In some ways, love is the quintessential
expression of individuality and freedom. At the same time, it offers intimacy, mutuality,
and sharing. In the ideal love relationship, these two aspects of love are perfectly joined-
love is both absolutely free and completely shared. . . .The sharing and commitment in a
love relationship can seem, for some, to swallow up the individual, making her (more often
than him) lose sight of her own interests, opinions, and desires. Paradoxically, since love is
supposed to be a spontaneous choice by free individuals, someone who has "lost" herself
cannot really love, or cannot contribute to a real love relationship. Losing a sense of one's
self may also lead to being exploited, or even abandoned, by the person one loves.
Id. at 93.
45. See id. and infra note 47.
46. See infra note 47.
47. The wisdom of Kahlil Gibran's Prophet is apropos:
Then Almitra spoke again and said, And what of Marriage, master?
And he answered saying:
You were born together, and together you shall be forevermore.
You shall be together when the white wings of death scatter your days.
Ay, you shall be together even in the silent memory of God.
But let there be spaces in your togetherness,
And let the winds of the heavens dance between you.
Love one another, but make not a bond of love:
Let it rather be a moving sea between the shores of your souls.
Fill each other's cup but drink not from one cup.
Give one another of your bread but eat not from the same loaf.
Sing and dance together and be joyous, but let each one of you be alone,
Even as the strings of a lute are alone though they quiver with the same music.
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relationship. In many ways the affirmation of self provides the drama in
divorce. 4
The importance of considering the nuances and complexities of the pri-
vate choices we make when creating familial relationships cannot be over-
stated. The private choice of love is intricately connected to the right to
procreate, the right to parental relationships, the right to intimate associa-
tions, and other cognizable family rights. These private family matters are
fundamental liberties protected by state regulation.
When family is considered as a fundamental liberty, it is not just a theo-
retical abstraction to those who privately choose to make a love connection.
It is personal, it is about self, and it matters. Consequently, much of who
we are and how we see the world is determined by what we define as consti-
tuting our familial relationships. Divorce is a legally sanctioned, domestic
reorganization of that fundamental relationship. Because one's self-dignity
is at stake, the dissolution process should facilitate a celebration or affirma-
tion of the individuality of both spouses.4 9
2. Marriage-A Public Concern
The state's role in relationship formation and realignment processes
must be recognized in order to fully understand what is at stake in the effort
to define family and family value. As indicated earlier, the state establishes
the new legal relations and responsibilities attendant after marital dissolu-
tion.5 o Therefore, the state is the party that is intimately concerned with
the consistent fulfillment of marital and post-marital responsibilities. 51
Under this premise, an assumption can be made that some connection
should exist between marital regulations and marital reality. This article
will now address that proposition.
Give your hearts, but not into each other's keeping.
For only the hand of Life can contain your hearts.
And stand together yet not too near together:
For the pillars of the temple stand apart,
And the oak tree and the cypress grow not in each other's shadow.
KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET 15-16 (1985).
48. See MEL KRANTZLER, CREATIVE DIVORCE 17-19 (1973)(approaching divorce as an op-
portunity for personal growth).
49. See Steven H. Hobbs, Facilitative Ethics in Divorce Mediation: A Law and Process Ap-
proach, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 325, 375-76 (1988).
50. See infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
51. Id.
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In The Legal Enterprise, Robert Rodes explores conceptions of our legal
order and how we utilize that legal order. 2 In discussing the history of
marriage, Rodes briefly traces the institution from its days as a mere busi-
ness transaction, based on a contract, to the modem era where marriage is
usually based on love. 3 Implicit in a modem era conceptualization of mar-
riage is the idea that the relationship is personal to the individual because an
individual is generally free to choose marriage.5 4
For Rodes, and indeed for most romantics, love is a free-will gift. 5 As
previously noted, marriage represents the surrendering of self, of expressing
choice by freely welcoming the bonds of matrimony and the accompanying
duties. 6 The law does not force a man and a woman to love each other or
to stay committed and obligated to the chosen lover,57 but those who do
choose to enter a marital relationship receive the endorsement and the pro-
52. ROBERT E. RODES, JR., THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE (1976). For a discussion of Rodes,
methodology for this endeavor, see id. at 3-10. I am indebted to my colleague, Tom Shaffer, for
suggesting this work.
53. Id. at 144-45.
54. Rodes specifically noted:
In more recent times, we have widened still further the gulf between marriage and business
by deciding that someone who talks an engaged person out of marrying is not subject to the
same liabilities as outsiders who interfere with other contracts. Indeed, by now most peo-
ple seem to feel that a contract to marry should not be enforced at all: it is inappropriate to
make anyone pay damages for not marrying.
Id.
55. Id. at 146.
56. Id. Certainly Bellah would agree. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Bellah's viewpoint.
57. See RODES, supra note 52, at 147.
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tection of the state-" However, marital choice entails the assumption of
marital duties.5 9
The legal recognition of marital choice (the personal relationship) and
marital duty (the obligations to one another) has significance to the princi-
ple of legal order. As Rodes notes:
My purpose with [my sketch of the law of domestic relations] is sim-
ply to establish that the commitment married people have to one
another is not so coercively enforced as to prevent their adhering to
it freely if they adhere at all, and yet that it gives rise to sufficient
expectations to be regarded as a source of rights. The law, like other
institutions of Western society, has undergone a long evolution in its
attitude toward the personal relation between man and woman, but
it has now settled on support for those who keep the personal and
juridical relations together and marry for love.6°
Rodes implies that a couple can commit to each other in love, but can
separate from each other should either love or the will to give and receive
love fade. This concept has legal significance. An orderly (lawful) way to
separate is recognized in the marital dissolution process. Thus, the law not
58. I. at 147-48. To assist in the maintenance of purity, the state offers the family protection
from within and without. See Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14
MICH. L. REv. 177, 178 (1916), where he discussed how the interests of individuals are protected
by society:
Accordingly two elements must be taken into accounting securing interests in domestic
relations. On the one hand there is the individual spiritual existence. From the beginning
the social interest in general security has required that the law secure adequately this fea-
ture of these relations since injuries thereto touch men on their most sensitive side, and no
injuries are more certain to provoke self-redress and even private war. With the develop-
ment of civilization, the social interest in the moral and social life of the individual, i.e., in
his claim to a social existence as a human being, reinforces this requirement. On the other
hand, there is the individual economic existence in which the purely economic side of such
relations may be of great importance. Here, sometimes, along with the social interest in
the individual moral and social life, the social interest in the relations as social institutions
may require careful securing of the purely economic advantages.
Another example is found in tort law that offers compensation for the economic loss of a
family member under workman's compensation laws or wrongful death suits.
The state is criticized when it does not offer adequate protection, as in the case of the federal
income tax system that penalizes a married couple who file a joint or separate information returns.
See Pamela B. Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's 1981 response to the "Marriage
Penalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 468, 469-85 (1983). When domestic violence threatens to
destroy the family, the state is chastised for failure to respond quickly to the imminent threat. See
Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: Deshaney in
Context, 68 N.C. L. REv. 659, 661-65 (1990).
59. Both Rodes and Bellah consider the paradox of offering love and self freely to another,
yet in so giving taking on the coustraints of marital duties. Fidelity is perhaps the most essential
such duty. See BELLAH, supra note 35, at 93-97; RODES, supra note 52, at 146.
60. RODES, supra note 52, at 147-48.
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only enables us to be in an autonomous love relationship but also allows us
to leave it once love or the marital purpose has failed.
Marriage creates certain expectations.61 One expectation is that the
marriage will be a commitment providing emotional and physical suste-
nance. The relationship also involves a recognition of parental status, and
whether the couple should have children or should adopt.62 A further ex-
pectation is the acquisition of an interest in the economic fruits of the mar-
riage.63 The marital formation and dissolution process should be
constructed to facilitate the fulfillment of these expectations. 4  Conse-
quently, in recognizing expectations, the law necessarily recognizes what
society values and the requirements society imposes on family relationships.
Family law attempts to delegate the responsibilities that flow from fam-
ily formation. Consider what society, through the law, demands of families.
The family is the only private, social institution that is required by society
to provide necessities (emotional and physical) for the individuals within
the family and yet equip those same individuals for life in the larger society.
If the family fails at either function, the state has the obligation not only to
modify or end the relationship, but also to fulfill these functions. These
responsibilities can be recast as the moral obligations or values that underlie
family law. In Gustafson's terms, society requires the participants to as-
sume the responsibilities arising out of the patterns and processes of interde-
pendence in marriage and family.
Familial legal rights and obligations are grounded in those moral values
that society deems important. The moral values of society intersect family
law at numerous points. Consider, for example, the issue of sex and its
consequences. Sexual fidelity, which is a vital part of the familial relation-
ship, may become a factor in child custody disputes.65 Similarly, if sexual
relationships are morally condoned within the bonds of matrimony, then
the law views nonmarital sexual relations as meretricious.66 Therefore, the
burden of proving that the relationship was not meretricious is always on
the party claiming a legal right to property division or support from a for-
mer sexual partner.67 Putative marriages and nonmarital cohabitations are
61. Indeed, the expectations created include both civil rights and civil obligations. See Rob-
ert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 329 (1979).
62. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 297-98 (1987).
63. In fact, the expectation of sharing in the economic fruits of the marriage is so strong that
if a contrary intention is indicated, it should be declared prior to marriage in an antenuptial
agreement. See UNIF. PRE-MARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1-13, 9B U.L.A. 369-80 (1987).
64. See Hobbs, supra note 49.
65. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 423 (Ill. 1979), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
66. Id. at 424.
67. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
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ready examples.6" Sexual relationships outside of marriage often result in
pregnancy. The mother is automatically given the legal status of parent
with attendant parental responsibilities of care and custody. The biological
father can claim moral or legal parental status or have parental status
thrust upon him in a paternity action.6 9
Other examples of this intersection between society's moral values and
family law are worth noting. Although health care is largely a private re-
sponsibility of families, the state requires that parents have their children
immunized against certain communicable diseases.70 Certain fundamental
values such as honesty and respect for property are generally transmitted
through the family. If this transmission of values is not successful, the
criminal justice system will punish juveniles and adults who violate society's
standards. Education is also a province of the family, but society considers
it so important that parents may be required to provide a higher education
for their children.71
3. Summary
When we search for family value we, as individuals, are searching for
something large, important, and special; something that other relationships
and institutions outside the family cannot fulfill. We search for family
value in that place described by Robert Frost as "the place where, when
you have to go, [t]hey have to take you in."72 When we arrive at that spe-
cial, desired place, we find what identifies and shapes us as human beings.
The search tells us how to act within a family relationship. How we con-
duct ourselves within and outside that relationship is of great importance.
Yet, family values have utility and desirability for the state in the role of
parens patriae. An examination of family worth is an examination of how
we, as members of society, conduct ourselves in the creation and mainte-
nance of family and in the realignment of our lives when families dissolve.
68. Id.
69. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987); see also Steven H. Hobbs & Mary
F. Mulligan, Centrist Judging and Traditional Family Values, or Why Papa Can't Be a Rolling
Stone, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 345 (1992) (discussing the proper role of the state in family
matters).
70. See Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the
Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REv. 799, 805 (1988).
71. See Turner v. Turner, 579 So. 2d 1381 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); Neudecker v. Neudecker,
577 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 1991). Contra Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989); Grapin v.
Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984); Wannamaker v. Carr, 362 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 1987); Smith v.
Smith, 447 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1989).
72. ROBERT FROST, COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 53 (1962) (from the poem "The
Death of the Hired Man").
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What evolves in this discourse on family values is a system of beliefs, philos-
ophies, and outlooks on life through which the proper functions, rules, and
responsibilities of family relationships are ordered. Implicit in this dis-
course are notions about the importance of taking care of one's family and
having the government's support in doing so.
In Gustafson's terms, the discourse on family values allows us as a soci-
ety to determine what should be required of individuals when forming fami-
lies. This discourse should proscribe the behavior of participants in the
patterns and processes of interdependence in marriage and family life. As a
result, we, individually and as a collective society, receive in return some-
thing good or desired-something of value. It is this treasure, hopefully
found in the human spirit, that gives the family its value and moral
grounding.73
III. FAMILY AS CIVIL RIGHT AND CIVIL OBLIGATION
This section will consider only our constitutional jurisprudence on the
family because a complete account of constitutional theory is beyond the
scope of this article.74 However, a portion of the theoretical foundation of
the constitutional jurisprudence will be analyzed by examining Maynard v.
Hill,75 the Supreme Court's first "real" family law case.7 6 This case
presents an opportunity to consider specifically the public nature of the pri-
vate family arrangements. It further provides the basic analytical frame-
work used by the Court in most family law cases. Maynard is a useful tool
for testing Gustafson's methodological inquiry of how the law and society
73. The family and those things that affect the family fall within the rubric of "a subject of
interest to the community." Goode has observed the family performing tasks that have extensive
societal implications:
More broadly, it is widely believed that the collective needs of the whole society are served
by some of the activities individual families carry out. In short, it is characteristic of the
varieties of the family that participants on an average enjoy more, and gain more comfort,
pleasure, or advantage from being in a familistic arrangement than from living alone; and
other members of the society view that arrangement as contributing in some measure to the
survival of the society itself. Members of societies have usually supposed it important for
most other individuals to form families, to rear children, to create the next generation, to
support and help each other - whether or not individual members of specific families do in
fact feel they gain real advantages from living in a familistic arrangement.
GOODE, supra note 9, at 12 (emphasis in original).
74. For additional accounts of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in family law, see Burt,
supra note 61; and Leonard P. Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 22 B.C. L.
REv. 935 (1981).
75. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
76. Id. at 192.
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enable and require individuals to participate in the patterns and processes of
interdependence in marriage and family life.
Using the secularized version of Gustafson's theory, the family can be
examined as a civil right (enablement) and a civil obligation or duty (re-
quirement)."' Political philosophers and theoreticians have considered the
right to a family as a fundamental liberty-part of the bundle of political
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.78 Our representative and constitu-
tional form of government enables us to exercise precious civil rights, but
also requires us to contribute to the general welfare of the larger commu-
nity. Civil right and civil obligation viewed in the family context calls for a
delicate and somewhat fluid balance, as demonstrated in Maynard.79
A. Maynard v. Hill: A Case Study
Maynard provides an instructive and careful study of the civil right and
obligation of the family and the impact it has on the familial rights and
duties as reflected in the operation of positive law. The decision is a proper
example of what the civil law in a constitutional republic requires and en-
ables its citizens to do in the formation of families. This section will ex-
amine the private rights and public duties of the family as implicated by the
issues presented to the Maynard Court. Such a consideration will aid our
search for the law's moral discourse on family.
B. Background
David and Lydia Maynard married in Vermont in 1828.80 In 1850, the
Maynards aid their two children, Henry and Frances, moved to Ohio.
David traveled on to California to seek his fortune, promising to send for
his family or to return within two years. He settled in the Territory of
Oregon and took advantage of a land grant program in April 1852. In or-
der to claim full title to the 640 acres he settled, David had to fulfill two
conditions: First, to work the land for four years, and second, to prove he
was a resident of the Territory and a married man as of December 1850.
Once he met both conditions, half of the land would be conveyed to David
and the other half would be conveyed to his wife.
77. A functional definition of a civil liberty, or right, can be delineated as "[p]ersonal, natural
rights guaranteed and protected by [the] Constitution." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
19, at 246.
78. See Henry H. Foster, Jr., Marriage: A "Basic Civil Right of Man", 37 FORDHAM L. REv.
51, 52 (1968).
79. See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205-09.
80. Id. at 191 (for the relevant facts of Maynard, see id. at 191-96).
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On December 22, 1852, David petitioned for and received a legislative
act dissolving the bonds of matrimony between himself and Lydia."' On
January 15, 1853, David married Catherine Brashears. In April 1856, the
territorial land officer, believing that David and Catherine had satisfied all
statutory requirements, issued one certificate for the west half of the tract to
David and another for the east half to Catherine. After several administra-
tive hearings, Catherine's certificate to the east half of the tract was can-
celed "because she was not [David's] wife on the first day of December,
1850, or within one year from that date, which was necessary, to entitle her
to one-half of the claim under the statute ....
Henry and Frances Maynard brought an action against Hill and Lewis,
the holders of United States patents for the east tract.8 3 Henry and Frances
claimed to be equitable owners of the land that should have belonged to
their mother, Lydia, and "pray[ed] that the defendants may be adjudged to
be [equitable] trustees, and directed to convey the lands to them by a good
and sufficient deed.... ,4
The Court considered the following two issues: whether the divorce was
valid; and whether, if valid, the divorce defeated the property rights of
Lydia. In considering the first issue, the Court initially had to determine
whether the territorial legislature had the authority to pass an act of di-
vorce. This crucial question has broad implications because its answer il-
lustrates the sweep and scope of authority a state possesses in regulating
domestic relationships. It is, essentially, a discourse on what society values.
81. David was a power in the territorial legislature and was instrumental in the establishment
of the State of Washington. For an examination of his life and times, see THOMAS W. PROSCH,
DAVID S. MAYNARD AND CATHERINE T. MAYNARD: BIOGRAPHIES OF Two OF THE OREGON
IMMIGRANTS OF 1850 (1906).
82. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 194. Specifically, the Court stated:
This certificate was [originally] annulled by the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
on the ground that, as it then appeared, and was supposed to be the fact, Lydia A. May-
nard, the first wife, was dead, and that her heirs were therefore entitled to half of the claim.
On a subsequent hearing before the register and receiver, the first wife appeared, and
they awarded the east half of the claim to her and the west half to the husband. From this
decision an appeal was taken to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and from
the decision of that officer to the Secretary of the Interior. The Commissioner affirmed the
decision of the register and receiver so far as it awarded the west half to the husband, but
reversed the decision so far as it awarded the east half to the first wife; holding that neither
wife was entitled to that half.
Id. at 193-94.
83. Id. at 195.
84. Id.
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C. The State's Authority to Regulate Family Affairs
In the first step of a two-step process, the Court found that Congress
had properly passed the organic act creating the territory of Oregon and
establishing a legislature with the power to act.85 The second step of the
process involved an analysis of the scope of that legislative power and the
limitations upon it-what may a civil government require and enable in the
realm of family? Nowhere is the character of this legislative power more
evident than in its nascency. The organic statute extended the legislative
power of the territory "'to all rightful subjects of legislation.' "86 In this
regard the Court observed:
[T]he legislative department, when not restrained by constitutional
provisions and a regard for certain fundamental rights of the citizen
which are recognized in this country as the basis of all government,
has acted upon everything within the range of civil government.
Every subject of interest to the community has come under its direc-
tion. It has not merely prescribed rules for future conduct, but has
legalized past acts, corrected defects in proceedings, and determined
the status, conditions, and relations of parties in the future. 7
Legislative power must respect constitutional limitations and individual
rights. There are certain private family matters that a citizen should be
enabled to do and that the government may only restrict with due regard of
those rights. Yet, the government has the power to require certain family
conduct and to order relationships of individuals in families.
In Maynard, the Court focused on the future domestic relationship and
rights of the parties.88 Because no legislative provision existed for the judi-
cial resolution of divorce disputes, the question was whether the legislature
had the power to initiate, sua sponte, its own divorce process. The Court
found that the legislature was competent to do so and held:
The granting of divorces was a rightful subject of legislation accord-
ing to the prevailing judicial opinion of the country, and the under-
85. Id at 203. The Court provided a brief historical legislative history of this act:
The act of Congress creating the Territory of Oregon, and establishing a government for it,
passed on the 14th of August, 1848, vested the legislative power and authority of the Terri-
tory in an Assembly, consisting of two boards, a Council and a House of Representatives.
9 Stat. 323, c. 177, § 4.... The grant is made in terms similar to those used in the act of
1836, under which the Territory of Wisconsin was organized. It is stated in Clinton v.
Englebrecht, that that act seemed to have full consideration; and from it all subsequent acts
for the organization of territories have been copied, with few and inconsiderable variations.
Id. at 203-04 (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 204.
87. Id at 205 (citation omitted).
88. Id at 203-05.
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standing of the profession, at the time the organic act of Oregon was
passed by Congress, when either of the parties divorced was at the
time a resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the legislature. 9
Because the phrase "rightful subjects of legislation" was ambiguous, the
Court considered four factors in determining the propriety of legislative
acts for divorce. First, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion draws definite borders for state legislative action.90 The state cannot
take or improperly restrict the federal rights of its citizens.91 Furthermore,
the state cannot legislate in areas pre-empted by Congress.92 Second, the
established custom and practice of legislatures provided some guidance.
Legislative divorces were widely accepted in England and many of the Col-
onies.93 Third, with respect to the citizens who are governed by the legisla-
ture, "[a] long acquiescence in repeated acts of legislation on particular
matters, is evidence that those matters have been generally considered by
the people as properly within legislative control."94 This factor suggests
that the citizenry generally agrees with the values expressed or implied in
the legislative acts. Fourth, changing government philosophy and wisdom
does not negate the legitimacy of validly passed acts. Rights and obliga-
tions created through the use of legislative power cannot be changed by the
winds of time but only by proper legislative amendment or repeal of the
act.9 5 This is especially true with respect to the legislative act of divorce,
where a host of rights and social relationships are involved, and should be
given the benefit of repose in the status quo.9 6
In reaching its conclusion that the divorce was valid, the Court noted
that custom and practice enhanced the validity of legislative authority to
end marriage. 97 Legislatures, in developing legislative divorce processes,
acted with the detailed formality of a judicial proceeding by allowing the
parties to appear with counsel, take testimony from witnesses, and consider
questions of fact.98 These measures arguably satisfied the principles of fair-
89. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 203.
91. Id.
92. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878), overruled by Thomas v. Review
Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
93. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 206-08.
94. Id. at 204.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 204-05. The Court observed in particular that "when the validity of acts dissolving
the bonds of matrimony is assailed, the legitimacy of many children, the peace of many families,
and the settlement of many estates depend [ ] upon its being sustained." Id.
97. Id. at 206.
98. Id. at 208.
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ness and due process, thereby lending further legitimacy to the legislative
custom.
D. The Public Nature of Family Status and Civil Contract-
A Constitutional Inquiry
Having established the legitimacy of legislative authority to grant an act
of divorce, the only other issue of statutory validity was whether the act of
divorce was constitutional. 99 According to the Court, the only constitu-
tional provision theoretically applicable was the contract clause. 1°° The
Court held this constitutional protection inapplicable to this act of a legisla-
ture, grounding its holding on the concept that the private domestic rela-
tionship begins as a public civil contract. 10 1 This concept reflects what
society requires of individuals who form families and how society enables
individuals to do that. Accordingly, Justice Field provided an excellent de-
scription of marriage as a civil contract:
It is also to be observed that, whilst marriage is often termed by text
writers and in decisions of courts a civil contract-generally to indi-
cate that it must be founded upon the agreement of the parties, and
does not require any religious ceremony for its solemnization-it is
something more than a mere contract. The consent of the parties is
of course essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is
executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created
which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, re-
stricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the
parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law
steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It
is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of soci-
ety, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress. 102
There are three observations to make about marriage as a civil contract.
First, as a civil contract, the marital relationship is "deemed an institution
of society"'103 rather than a creature of the Church (generic) or purely a
matter of individual free choice."° As a social relation created by law, the
99. IM. at 206. Of course, this was the principal issue to be decided in this case.
100. Id at 210. The Court refers to the "obligation of the contract of marriage." Id. (citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10).
101. Id. at 210-16.
102. Id at 210-11.
103. Id at 214.
104. See Kandoian, supra note 30, at 1835-39; see also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying
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legal characteristics of marriage are established by the sovereign power of
the state. As stated earlier, even if the public philosophy changes concern-
ing the nature of these legal characteristics, the characteristics themselves
cannot be changed except by amendment or repeal of the law.' °5 As an
institution of society, the domestic relationship can only "be abrogated by
the sovereign will whenever the public good, or justice to both parties, or
either of the parties would thereby be subserved."' 6 The sovereign thus
requires much from the individuals, yet it enables the individuals to deter-
mine the content and context of their family relationships and to form a
private love connection.10 7
Second, the creation of the domestic relationship is relatively simple-
the parties need only agree to enter into the relationship. The parties must
give their consent, each to the other, to live together as husband and
wife.'00 If they choose to become parents, they mutually consent to bring a
child into their relationship through birth or adoption. At the same time,
they also consent to a bundle of obligations and liabilities that are embed-
ded in positive law and that are deemed valuable and essential by society.109
However, mere consent to live together or to parent a child is insufficient to
create a domestic status with concomitant legal obligations and rights. The
"consent" of the sovereign, and thus the conferring of legal obligation and
rights, is obtained via the marital licensing process, the parentage determi-
nation process, and the adoption process. Increasingly, when the law is
silent, sovereign consent to form family relationships in creative and alter-
native ways is being issued by judicial fiat.1 0
105. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384-86 (Fla. 1970); WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH &
SANFORD N. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 1-4 (1983).
106. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 212 (citing Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 181, 183 (1838)).
107. CALEB FOOTE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 217-58 (3d ed. 1985).
108. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211-12 (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480, 483 (1863)). The
Court described this consensual coming together as "a relation the most important, as affecting
the happiness of individuals, the first step from barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest tie of
social life and the true basis of human progress." Id.
109. Id. at 211.
110. See supra note 30. Generally, the consensus of these articles is that nonmarital relation-
ships or cohabitations are becoming increasingly popular and recognized methods of ordering
one's personal relationships. However, states are reluctant to use the judicial system to protect
individuals who shun the obligations and liabilities of civil family laws and yet then request di-
vorce-like remedies in ending nonmarital relationships.
The trend toward official acceptance of alternative lifestyles may foretell a more profound
social change in the character of domestic status. Historically, the parties did not have the ability
to change the terms of the civil contract of marriage. They simply had no bargaining power to
change the obligations and liabilities of marriage. Furthermore, they could not terminate the
relationship at will. Without judicial or legislative fiat ending the relationship, one spouse could
be charged with abandonment.
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The parties could also enter into the civil contract of marriage infor-
mally. At common law, the expressed or implied intent to live together
and to appear to the public as if husband and wife over a requisite period of
time conferred common-law marital status.111 Common-law marriage has
largely been abolished in this country, mainly because it is difficult to prove
the requisite intention to take on liabilities and obligations normally created
by the official operation of the law.112 Also, the alleged immorality of
nonmarital, meretricious relationships dictates a strong public policy favor-
ing formal marriage. 113 This is particularly evident when one notes the ease
of entering the marital relationship.114 The simple marital regulatory
scheme is highlighted by the fact that no formal preparation or instruction
is needed to enter into marriage.
Third, marriage as a civil status encompasses the notion that "the main-
tenance of ... its purity" is a matter of public concern. 1 5 As suggested
earlier, the family is the basic unit of society. Family has been called "a
great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity." '11 6 Per-
haps for this reason, Justice Field expounded that civilization depended
upon the basic marital unit.117 Moreover, he asserted that the protection
and preservation of the marital institution was a sign of progress. 118 From
time to time various societies have attempted to hasten progress by propos-
ing alternatives to the basic structure of nuclear families.1 19 But even with
all its shortcomings, the nuclear family created by private choice seems best
adapted for civilization and progress. 120
111. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 45-62 (2d ed. 1988).
112. See CLARK, supra note 111.
113. See § 21-18.1, Solicitation for Fornication, Sodomy or Adultery, Code of the City of Roa-
noke, Virginia (1979); Victims of the City Solicitation Law, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
Dec. 24, 1990.
114. CLARK, supra note 111, at 35-37 (describing the requirements for receiving a marriage
license).
115. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211.
116. Id. at 213 (quoting Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 49-50 (1857)).
117. Id. at 211.
118. Id.
119. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (Justice McReynold's discusses
Plato's contention that the welfare of his ideal state would force all children to be separated from
their natural parents and raised communally with other children with suitable qualifications).
120. On a personal note, I am married with four children. The care and feeding of four
children is, to say the least, a challenge. The tasks are made easier because I share them with my
wife. I recognize how difficult it must be for a single person to raise children. All of us can do a
better job with help from a partner, other family members, or friends. What this suggests to me is
that we ought to talk about a broader, more fluid definition of nuclear family. Perhaps a place to
start is to study that tight group of individuals who always show up at family-oriented events,
such as graduation from nursery school, soccer games, and family counselling sessions.
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E. Other Rightful Subjects of Legislation Connected to the
Divorce Process
With respect to the Court's resolution in Maynard of the ultimate issue
of property, one should note that the rightful subjects of state legislation
directed toward the family fall into three broad categories: property, eco-
nomic (support), and social (child custody, living arrangements, and
morals).121 All three were implicated in the Maynard opinion. 122
1. Property
a. Spousal Property
After a determination that a disputed item is property, distribution
upon marital dissolution usually involves five basic inquiries: (1) who has
title to the property; (2) when was it acquired (before or during the mar-
riage); (3) should it be classified as marital or nonmarital property; (4) what
is its value; and (5) how should it be divided. 123
In Maynard, the Court held that Lydia had no interest in the property
because under the statutory scheme of the land grant program, David could
not obtain a vested interest in the land until after he had settled and culti-
vated it for four years. 124 At the time of the divorce in 1852, David pos-
sessed only an inchoate interest and, consequently, Lydia could not have an
interest greater than her husband's. 125 Because she was not his legal wife at
the time David satisfied the land grant requirements, Lydia did not qualify
as a grantee to half of the settled property.126
b. Children as Property Heirs
The decision in Maynard demonstrates another aspect of marital prop-
erty: The property rights of heirs may be contingent on the marital status
of their parents. Here, Henry and Frances lost because Lydia possessed no
property rights and, consequently, no property rights could pass to them by
121. Property can be classified as an economic or wealth issue. It is classified separately
because property is regulated by a separate body of substantive law. Property rights also have
implications outside of the family relationship. Additionally, property in divorce is usually
quickly disposed and its disposition, absent fraud or mistake, is usually not subject to modifica-
tion. Economic issues involve the accessories of life and are subject to continued judicial
supervision.
122. See infra notes 123-141 and accompanying text.
123. See JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF, CASES ON PROPERTY DIVISION AT MARRIAGE DISSOLU-
TION 240-46 (1983).
124. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 214-16.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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intestate succession. The question arises why they asserted a claim for their
mother's property and not their father's property, assuming, of course, that
nothing actually passed to them from their father's estate? Answering that
question reveals even more about marital property regulation. At the time
David perfected his rights in one half of the tract of land, he was not mar-
ried to Lydia but to Catherine. As his legal wife, Catherine acquired an
interest in, but not title to that property. Because no testamentary device
existed at the time of David's death in 1873, the property most likely passed
completely to Catherine by intestate succession. When Catherine died, the
property passed beyond the claims of David's children because they were
not Catherine's natural heirs.
Henry and Frances no doubt felt they had a right to some land, either
their father's or their mother's, because they brought their claim to the state
court for an adjudication of their rights. If they had been able to appear
before the religious elders for resolution of their claim according to biblical
adjudication principles, at the very least Henry might have claimed the
property as a birthright. But, because marital property regulation involves
a civil right, other factors important to the state are determinative. Mainly,
the state has an interest in quickly settling any property claims, especially
those in marital property.127
Interestingly, had David and Lydia's divorce been found invalid, Cathe-
rine probably would have been classified as a putative wife.1 28 The question
then would have been what marital property rights, if any, did either Lydia
or Catherine possess. 29
Another interesting aspect of this case to contemplate is the validity of
David and Lydia's marriage in Vermont in 1828. If their marriage had
been invalid, many issues arise. Would David and Lydia have satisfied the
requirements for a common-law marriage? Which state's law would apply
in that determination: Vermont, Ohio, or the Territory of Oregon? Would
Henry and Frances be considered illegitimate? How would their illegiti-
macy have affected their rights to the intestate succession of property?
These questions demonstrate the broad range of legal issues that arise from
the state regulation of family as civil right and obligation.
127. See Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse!
Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 751 (1988).
128. See Christopher L. Blakesly, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1, 2-13
(1985).
129. See id. at 52-60; see also CLARK, supra note 111, at 53-56.
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2. Support
Economic issues in divorce usually involve support, which is simply the
means for providing for the necessities of life to the spouse and children.
When David left Lydia and the children in Ohio (a new domicile for the
family), he provided no support for them and never afterwards met his sup-
port obligation. 3 ' Although Justice Field castigated David for his derelic-
tion of duty, he reasoned that "the loose morals and shameless conduct of
the husband can have no bearing upon the question of the existence or ab-
sence of power in the Assembly to pass the act [of divorce]."' 31 It is signifi-
cant to note, however, that the Court uses the language of morality to
describe the requirement of support. The use of such language supports the
conclusion that the obligation of support is valued by society and should be
taken very seriously. 32
3. Social Issues
a. Custody
Custody, living arrangements, and proper moral conduct are the social
issues typically involved in a divorce. Had David and Lydia's divorce been
handled in a more traditional manner, the responsibility for child custody
might have been contested. Would the children have lived in Ohio or Ore-
gon? What visiting privileges would have been granted? In a more contem-
porary divorce setting, would a court have considered joint physical and
legal custody? 133
b. Moral Approbations
The proper moral conduct of each spouse also becomes an issue in di-
vorce. Because the facts in Maynard are only circumstantial, the question
not asked in that case is whether David Maynard committed adultery
130. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 192.
131. Id. at 210. Since Congress retained legislative oversight of the legislation passed by terri-
torial governments, Justice Field posited that "if the facts stated had been brought to the attention
of Congress, that body might and probably would have annulled the act." Id.
132. See REVISED UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 381
(Supp. 1992); DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD
SUPPORT 165-97 (1979); HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PER-
SPECTIVE 51-95 (1981).
133. As a society, we continue to engage in discourse on the proper methods of determining
child care and custody. See Beverly Horsburgh, Redefining the Family: Recognizing the Altruistic
Caretaker and the Importance of Relational Needs, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 423, 468-79 (1992);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property,
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992); Stephanie Simon, Joint Custody Loses Favor for Increasing
Children's Feeling of Being Torn Apart, WALL ST. J., July 15, 1991, at B-1.
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before his divorce. No evidence exists that suggests David's living arrange-
ment with Catherine Brashears was meretricious before David did the
"honorable thing" and married Catherine three weeks after his divorce.
Historically, extra-marital relations have been condemned by society.
134
Although sexual promiscuity is generally tolerated by today's society, ex-
tant laws in some states prohibit fornication. 135 Incest, bigamy, and domes-
tic violence are other social issues that receive the moral condemnation of
society and the state through prohibitory laws.
F. Selected Conclusions To Be Drawn From Maynard
Maynard sharpens the focus of the civil nature of the domestic relation-
ship. Consider the role and function of the government in this area. As a
general proposition, the state is responsible for the overall regulation of do-
mestic relations. The state establishes the ground rules for marriage, di-
vorce, and the care of children. 136
Many reasons or purposes may account for why individuals marry,
among them religion, convenience, family pressure, and economic and so-
cial advancement. If any of these purposes are not fulfilled, the state pro-
vides a process by which the relationship terminates. Justice Field
articulated the state's justification for allowing the parties to dissolve the
relationship:
Many causes may arise, physical, moral, and intellectual-such as
the contracting by one of the parties of an incurable disease like lep-
rosy, or confirmed insanity or hopeless idiocy, or a conviction of a
felony-which would render the continuance of the marriage rela-
tion intolerable to the other party and productive of no possible ben-
efit to society.13
7
The state's dual justifications for dissolution focus on both the interests
of the individual and the interests of society. The individual is freed from
the obligations of the marital contract because of frustration of purpose, a
concept based in contract law. The modern-day version of this concept in
family law is reflected in the no-fault legislative standards of irreconcilable
differences and formal separation requirements.138 Thus, society suppos-
edly benefits because an unhealthy, unproductive family unit is abandoned
and because the individual members who have separated now can contrib-
ute to society in other forums or in new domestic relationships.
134. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
135. See VA. ANN. CODE § 18.2-344 (Miechie 1990); Wis. STAT. § 944.15 (1979-80).
136. See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205.
137. I i
138. See VA. ANN. CODE § 20-91 (Michie 1990).
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Another aspect of the state's role and function in the family concerns
the establishment of the divorce process; the how of achieving a family dis-
solution. Dissolving a marriage requires judicial investigations in order to
consider the legal standards that justify the dissolution. Even if the parties
come to court with a prenegotiated divorce settlement, the power of the
state to end the marriage is usually exercised by a judicial decree. No disso-
lution is possible until the legal fact of dissolution is recognized in a final
court order.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF MORAL DISCOURSE
Most domestic relations cases reflect Maynard's jurisprudential ap-
proach. Issues are addressed in such a manner as to examine the public
concerns in the private choices of family and family relationships. The
Court essentially applies Gustafson's framework and factors in society's in-
terest. In doing so, the Court seeks the appropriate balance between public
concern and private choice. A brief consideration of the two most often
cited constitutional cases in domestic relations jurisprudence illustrates this
proposition.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,139 the Court considered a statute prohibiting for-
eign language instruction in any public, private, or parochial school to any
pupil until the completion of eighth grade."4 The Court considered
whether the statute was an infringement of a liberty interest protected by
the Constitution.141 While acknowledging that liberty was a concept with-
out exact definition, the Court declared:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God...,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 142
Liberty must, therefore, include the right to have a family, a right which
also entails "the natural duty of the parent to give his children education
suitable to their station in life."' 43
While acknowledging the right of the state "to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally and morally,"" and its right to select curric-
139. 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
140. Id. at 397-98.
141. Id. at 399.
142. Id. (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
143. Id. at 400.
144. Id. at 401.
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ula for common education, the state must, nevertheless, respect the consti-
tutionally protected liberty interests of its citizens.14 In other words, it is
essential for the orderly pursuit of happiness that free parents educate and
train children in such a manner as deemed appropriate by them. 1"
Although critics contend that Meyer went too far in its protection of the
liberty interest in family, this case provided the basis for constitutional re-
view of other state intrusions into "the private realm of family life."147 In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,148 the Court considered whether Oregon could
require all children under the age of sixteen to attend only public school. 4 9
The Society of Sisters operated a parochial school that provided
"[s]ystematic religious instruction and moral training according to the ten-
ets of the Roman Catholic Church." 150
Oregon's scheme for public education was challenged on the theory that
parents had a fundamental liberty interest in educating their children, an
interest which could not be "abridged by legislation which has no reason-
able relation to some purpose within the competency of the State."1 '' The
Court, again acknowledging the power of the state to enact "reasonable"
legislation concerning compulsory education, 152 held that under the doc-
145. Id.
146. See id at 399.
147. See ia at 399-401. The case has been criticized for stretching the concept of liberty too
far. In the companion case of Bartles v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), which reversed convictions for
violating similar statutes prohibiting foreign language instruction on the authority of Meyers, Jus-
tice Holmes, in dissent, stated:
[I]t is desirable that all the citizens of the United States should speak a common tongue,
and therefore that the end aimed at by the statute is a lawful and proper one. The only
question is whether the means adopted deprive teachers of the liberty secured to them by
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .But if it is reasonable it is not an undue restriction of the
liberty either of teacher or scholar. No one would doubt that a teacher might be forbidden
to teach many things, and the only criterion of his liberty under the Constitution that I can
think of is "whether, considering the end in view, the statute passes the bounds of reason
and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat."
Id. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see infra notes 148-190 and accompanying
text on the role of the court in defining the extent of the right to family.
148. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
149. Id. at 532-35.
150. Id. at 535.
151. Id. at 534-35.
152. Idc at 534. The Court further asserted:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that
all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral charac-
ter and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
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trine enunciated in Meyer, the Oregon legislative scheme impermissibly in-
terfered with the liberty interests of parents. The Court reasoned:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to stand-
ardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.1 53
Both Meyer and Pierce unconditionally proclaim that there is a funda-
mental liberty interest in the family. However, both do so without specifi-
cally defining the contours of the family right. Also implicit in these cases
is the recognition of an appropriate role for the state in the private realm of
family life. As much as there is a civil right to family, there also exist civil
duties (also not defined with specificity) that society expects the family or
family member to fulfill "as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men." '154 A closer examination of the family as civil right (enablement)
and civil duty (requirement) highlights the contours and multitextured na-
ture of family as a civil enterprise of enabling and requiring.
V. How VALUABLE A RIGHT
The final aspect of family to consider is the issue of constitutional pro-
tection of civil right and civil duty as applied to the family. More broadly,
how free are we to privately order the nature and content of our familial
relationships? In other words, how should the state enable us to exercise
the right? As pointed out in Maynard, the state has a powerful interest in,
and the necessary authority to consider, the family institution as a rightful
subject of regulation. 155 However, as constitutional guarantees limit the ex-
tent of that regulation, this analysis suggests an appropriate judicial review
standard for domestic relations legislation: Did the legislature have the au-
thority to enact the law; and does the law infringe upon constitutionally
protected rights? If the law satisfies these standards, then the court will not
inquire into the motives behind the enactment.156 An examination of sev-
eral areas of family legislation that have come under constitutional attack
reveals the complexities and nuances of constitutional analysis involving
civil rights and civil obligations. Such an analysis seems at times too ethe-
153. Id. at 535.
154. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
155. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
156. Id. at 207-08.
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real to define and describe with specificity. This section will note several
key areas and offer observations about them.
1 7
A. Right to Marry
The state regulates who can get married, at what age they may marry,
whom they may marry, and what prerequisites they must complete before
marriage. Some of these regulations are of a practical nature. For example,
marriage is an event that emancipates a minor but, as a practical matter,
some couples are too young to assume the serious responsibilities of adult-
hood. Some marry in haste without thoughtful reflection; thus, many states
require a short waiting period between the marriage license application and
the marriage ceremony. Some enter marriage after engaging in active sex-
ual lives; therefore, this is an appropriate opportunity to require a health
examination in order to protect the new partner and any progeny.
However, even pragmatism has its limits. For instance, some individu-
als enter a subsequent marriage while still financially obligated to children
of a prior marriage. Fearing that the children of prior marriages might
become welfare wards of the state, Wisconsin enacted legislation prohibit-
ing subsequent marriages without court permission, which was given upon
proof that all child support obligations were current and could be met in the
future.' 5 ' In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court held that although
this statutory scheme to protect the out-of-custody child was a "legitimate
and substantial interest" of the state, it could not be sustained because "the
means selected by the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily im-
pinge on the right to marry. ... ."119
Moreover, on a deeper level, marital regulations are grounded on much
more than pragmatism. Because they reflect the moral values of society,
the context of these moral values may determine the constitutional value of
the right to marry. For instance, before 1968, antimiscegenation laws
prohibiting interracial marriages were on the books of sixteen states.' 60 The
Supreme Court declared such laws unconstitutional when it held that "[t]he
157. This section will not detail the constitutional methods of analysis suggested by theories
of substantive due process, procedural due process, or equal protection and privacy.
158. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978) (constitutionality of Wis. STAT. §§ 245.10
(1), (4), (5) (1973)).
159. Id. at 388.
160. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967). At the time the Court decided Loving, fourteen
other states had repealed their laws prohibiting interracial marriage since 1952. See id. at 6 n.5.
Virginia and other states believed miscegenation was a rightful subject of legislation "'to preserve
the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of
citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride,' obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White
Supremacy." Id at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)).
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Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not
be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.... [T]o marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State."16'
Reynolds v. United States162 provides another example of societal moral
value impacting the civil right of family. George Reynolds challenged the
constitutionality of a bigamy conviction under a congressional statute for
the Territory of Utah.'63 Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, stated that he believed in the "accepted doc-
trine of that church 'that it was the duty of male members of said church,
circumstances permitting, to practise [sic] polygamy. . . ." "'I After dis-
cussing the worldwide history of societal prohibition of polygamy, the
Court rejected Reynolds's claim that religious belief justified polygamous
marriage when it held:
[W]e think it may safely be said there never has been a time in any
State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence [sic]
against society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with
more or less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible
to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was
intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important fea-
ture of social life.'6 '
B. Right to Procreate
Moral factors also influence regulation of the most intimate aspects of
the marital relationship. Included in the civil right to marry is the freedom
to engage in private, consensual, sexual conduct, regardless of whether pro-
creation results. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,'66 the Supreme Court considered
a statute authorizing the sterilization of habitual criminals who "hav[e]
been convicted two or more times for crimes 'amounting to felonies involv-
161. Id. at 12. Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very
existence and survival. Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also Maynard
125 U.S. at 190. The Court in Loving further held that "[t]o deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." Loving, 388 U.S. at
12 (Stewart, I., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
162. 98 U.S. 145 (1878), overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
163. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145.
164. Id. at 161.
165. Id. at 165.
166. 316 U.S. 535 (1941).
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ing moral turpitude .... "167 The State sought to eliminate the possibility
that habitual criminals would produce "socially undesirable offspring."' 68
Using a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis because not all
habitual criminals were treated alike, the Court found:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, far reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands
it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group
to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual
whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is
to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty. 169
The Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 17 0 held that forcing a married
couple to procreate by forbidding the use of contraceptives is equally as
intrusive on the right to a family. 17 1 The Griswold Court held that constitu-
tional guarantees in the Bill of Rights created a zone of privacy within
which the marital relationship was protected from governmental intru-
sion. 172 A criminal statute banning contraceptives would allow "the police
to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives."' 173 The State not only attempted to discourage ex-
tramarital and nonmarital sexual relations as a way of upholding high
moral standards, but condemned the very use of contraceptives as im-
moral. 174 As Justice Harlan so aptly noted in his dissent in a case proceed-
ing Griswold, Poe v. Ullman:175
It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-
marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies
167. d at 536.
168. Id at 538.
169. Id at 541.
170. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
171. Id at 484-85.
172. Id. at 485.
173. Id at 485. Justice Douglas, viewing this not only as an intrusion into the home but also
into the very essence of the marital relationship, asserted:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.
Id at 486.
174. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the Court refused
to reach the constitutionality of the Connecticut law at issue in Griswold on ripeness grounds).
175. Id.
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inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law
the details of that intimacy.176
The issue of procreation is not as clear cut when it involves nonmarried
individuals engaging in private, consensual, sexual conduct. However, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck down, on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, a Massachusetts statute that required doctors and pharmacists to
dispense contraceptive devices by prescription only to married individu-
als.1 77 Applying the low-level scrutiny of the rational relationship analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found "that the goals of de-
terring premarital sex and regulating the distribution of potentially harmful
articles cannot reasonably be regarded as legislative aims of [the stat-
ute]."' 78 The Court found it "plainly unreasonable to assume that Massa-
chusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as
punishment for fornication."' 79 The Court further reasoned that the State's
justification for the law was dubious when it noted that both sections of the
statute "do not at all regulate the distribution of contraceptives when they
are to be used to prevent, not pregnancy, but the spread of disease."'180
Chief Justice Burger's dissent articulated the disagreement over how much
constitutional protection the right to family deserves and how far the right
is to be extended. He asserted that the right of privacy should not be ex-
tended "into the uncircumscribed area of personal predilections." 18'
C. Right to Create a Nontraditional Family
Nowhere is the debate over the constitutional character and value of
family right more evident than in the nonfamily areas of state regulation
that nevertheless impacts the family. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
the Court considered a single-family zoning ordinance which described in
detail who could belong to the single family.' 82 Moore lived with her son,
his child, and the child of another of her other sons. The presence of this
176. Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
177. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
178. Id. at 443.
179. Id. at 448. The Court also found it incongruous that the distribution of devices for
contraceptive purposes was classified a felony but that the conduct sought to be proscribed, forni-
cation, was classified a misdemeanor. Id. at 449-50.
180. Id. at 449. For a more complicated version of the problem of nonmarital sexual rela-
tionships, see Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where the court
struck down the "squeal rule," which required federally-funded family planning programs to in-
form the parents of an unemancipated minor any time a contraceptive device or a prescription for
a contraceptive device was given to that minor.
181. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 472 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
182. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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second grandchild, whose mother had died while he was an infant, violated
the ordinance.'1
3
In a plurality opinion highlighting the "venerable" tradition of extended
families, Justice Powell found a protectable liberty interest in a household
with kinfolk beyond the nuclear family circle.'" 4 He utilized the substan-
tive due process analysis as articulated by Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ull-
man.' Justice Brennan, in a stirring concurrence "underscor[ing] the
cultural myopia of the arbitrary boundary drawn by the East Cleveland
ordinance,"' 8 6 stated that:
The prominence of other than nuclear families among ethnic and
racial minority groups, including our black citizens, surely demon-
strates that the "extended family" pattern remains a vital tenet of
our society. It suffices that in prohibiting this pattern of family liv-
ing as a means of achieving its objectives, appellee city has chosen a
device that deeply intrudes into family associational rights that his-
torically have been central, and today remain central, to a large pro-
portion of our population.187
Justice Stevens based his concurrence on the property clause and the
zoning standards articulated in Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. 88 and Nectow v.
Cambridge. I 9 Chief Justice Burger dissented because Mrs. Moore failed to
exhaust her administrative remedy of seeking a zoning variance before com-
ing to federal court.'19 Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist in dis-
sent, could find no basis in the freedom of association guarantee of the First
Amendment for extending the right of familial privacy in this context.' 9 '
He wrote:
When the Court has found that the Fourteenth Amendment placed
a substantive limitation on a state's power to regulate, it has been in
those rare cases in which the personal interests at issue have been
deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." The interest
183. Id. at 496-97.
184. Id at 504-06 (Justice Powell delivered the opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined).
185. Id. at 501-02.
186. Id. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
187. Id. at 510 (footnote omitted).
188. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
189. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The "ordinance constitutes a taking of property without due pro-
cess and without just compensation." Moore, 431 U.S. at 521 (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
and Nectow, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)). In reviewing additional prior cases, Justice Stevens concluded
that "[t]he intrusion on that basic property right has not previously gone beyond the point where
the ordinance defines a family to include only persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption."
Id at 519.
190. Id. at 521 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 533-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
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that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen
and a suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply
does not rise to that level. To equate this interest with the funda-
mental decisions to marry and to bear and raise children is to extend
the limited substantive contours of the Due Process Clause beyond
recognition.1 92
D. Observations
The question of what society through law can require of families and
what they should be enabled to do lies at the heart of the debate over the
nature and value of the family. How do we define the family, in jurispru-
dential terms, with certainty? What aspects of familial relations can be val-
ued as fundamental liberties? Which concept of due process, substantive or
procedural, should be applied?193 What is the role of the Supreme Court in
evaluating the state's right and authority to legislate in the domestic rela-
tions area? Does the judiciary or legislature's particular ideological frame
of reference in family matters enter into the determination?194 Answers to
these questions vary over time and depend upon current social thought.
An examination of the jurisprudential nature of family as civil rights
and civil duties demonstrates the multifaceted nature of the issues involved.
The civil right of family is of immense value to the individual; it confers a
mixture of rights, liabilities, and obligations. The civil right of family is also
192. Id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.) (citations omitted).
193. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); and Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Even if the members of the Court agree on the appropriate standard
of review, they may reach differing results. Consider the question of whether the state has af-
forded adequate due process safeguards in termination of parental rights, as considered in
Santosky. The Court engaged in a balancing of the three factors that had been set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, (1976). Justice Blackmun stated the issue as follows:
In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the
risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing
governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight. Evaluation of the
three Eldridge factors compels the conclusion that use of a "fair preponderance of the
evidence" standard in such proceedings is inconsistent with due process.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758.
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and O'Connor, would have deferred to the wisdom of both the state legislature that had enacted a
comprehensive, multi-level termination procedure and the state judiciary that had sat at the hear-
ing and considered all the evidence of parental unfitness. See id. at 776-81 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Burger, C.J., White, J., O'Connor, J.). In contemplating the proper role of the
Court in reviewing such legislation, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the majority's decision
"cavalierly rejects the considered judgment of the New York Legislature in an area traditionally
entrusted to state care. The Court thereby begins, I fear, a trend of federal intervention in state
family law matters which surely will stifle creative responses to vexing problems." Id. at 791.
194. See generally Hobbs, supra note 9.
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of such essential value to society that it is a rightful subject of legislation.
The state seeks to promote the good of the individual family and the indi-
viduals within the family, which in turn promotes the good of society. In
this sense, the family is truly a public institution.
Standards of familial conduct as reflected in the notion of family civil
right and civil duty are influenced and determined by state regulation when
the state acts with proper legislative authority. But there must be restraints
on legislative enactments affecting familial conduct. Indeed, the legislative
process has its own internal restraints in a representative democracy. States
are restrained from unnecessary interference in the domestic relationship by
constitutional imperatives. Balancing the tension between enabling private
civil rights and requiring public civil duties becomes the task of both courts
and legislatures. More significantly, the task of balancing that tension falls
on us, the people who ultimately influence these institutions.
Constitutional imperatives intersect and influence the development of
laws drafted to encompass the values of society. The morality and values of
society, ever changing, may or may not determine the extent of family civil
rights and obligations. For instance, an individual does not have a right to
a polygamous marital relationship-the predominant societal moral philos-
ophy being determinative. However, a person may simultaneously be obli-
gated to support both a present and a former spouse as serial marriage
becomes a predominant social pattern. This phenomenon has spawned a
new debate on the purpose and use of alimony.
An individual has a right to marry someone of another race-the pre-
dominant moral philosophy not being determinative. However, the inter-
racial marriage must be with someone of the opposite sex who is not within
a prohibited degree of consanguinity-again, the predominant moral phi-
losophy being determinative. However, moral philosophy is being chal-
lenged as we debate the issue of same-sex marriages.
Yet, claiming a civil right to family brings us full circle. We claim the
right by taking on the domestic status of companion or parent and ac-
cepting the public benefits, such as intestate property succession, use of the
judicial system to obtain support or divide property, or acceptance of gov-
ernment largesse contingent on domestic status. This is a tacit acceptance
of the civil and personal obligation attendant to the right. This is the civil
obligation aspect. By the mere act of demanding a constitutional right to
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the integrity of one's family, an individual personally adopts the minimum
standards of acceptable conduct within the family.195
A more accurate description might liken this to a personal pact with the
state. Personal or religious beliefs may inspire a higher level of moral con-
duct in the family-for instance, as demonstrated by a desire to educate
one's children in a parochial school or on an Amish farm. But personal or
religious tenets will never justify breaking the personal pact with the state
or changing its terms. The possible exception is a religious belief or a secu-
lar value system of such moral imperative that civil disobedience is an ac-
ceptable, personal alternative. In that case, one willingly faces the legal
consequences.
Ultimately, it is in the state's best interest to optimize the opportunities
to successfully fulfill these civil responsibilities and to enable citizens to en-
joy the right to a family. The morals and well-being of the larger commu-
nity depend upon the health of individual family units. What constitutes
"good family health" changes over time as the values of society change.196
The collective values of society shape the customs, practices, and legislative
enactments on family to which the members of society will acquiesce and
look to for guidance in their own family conduct. This interactive process
provides the foundation for the larger concept of family as civil right and
duty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The family values discourse by politicians is arguably high on moral
tone but embarrassingly low on substantive content. All have a vision of
family grounded in their own ideological backgrounds, which captures only
a portion of the American family collage. Their visions reflect the fact that
we can not agree, as a society, on what family values are or should be.
Individuals fall in and out of love, have children with and without the
benefit of marriage, and basically struggle to fulfill their emotional and so-
cial needs that define fundamental human relationships. Maynard demon-
strates that although the government can rightfully draft marriage, divorce,
and child custody legislation, the Constitution limits the power to require
individuals to conform to moral values esteemed by only some, not all, of
195. The current moral discourse on same-sex marriages is about being enabled to make the
claim of a civil right to form such a family, to be entitled to the public benefits, and to be equally
required to fulfill the public obligations.
196. Witness the revolutionary changes in family law during the past three decades: no-fault
divorce, joint custody, and the development of new concepts of marital property. The will of the
people as to what is socially desirable is expressed through the legislature, subject only to the
Constitution and the laws of the United States. See supra notes 139-153 and accompanying text.
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our citizens. Those who hold public office can lead by moral suasion and
example but ultimately must respect the myriad private love choices of our
citizens.
However, the government can legitimately enable families to fulfill func-
tions useful to the welfare of our society. For example, it can provide op-
tions for child care and older adult care for those who work. Because
society requires the family to be ultimately responsible for health care and
education, government can ease those burdens by making access to quality
health care and education a right for all. When family members must finan-
cially support the family, government should strive to direct or assist eco-
nomic growth. This is particularly critical as old industries fade and new,
high technology jobs are required to effectively compete in a global econ-
omy. Additionally, our tax system should be structured in a way that does
not penalize families and that lightens the tax burdens of those who have
family members dependent upon them.
This is family values in action. We, as a society, should recognize the
limits of what we can require of families. And yet we should strive to en-
able families to accomplish those things which are of value and use to our
society.
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